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It is with rivers as it is with people: the greatest are not always the
most agreeable, nor the best to live with.
Henry Van Dyke'

1.

(1920).

HENRY VAN DYKE, LIrrLE RIvERs:

A BOOK

OF EssAYS IN PROFrrABLE IDLENESS

5,
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the parts of the country where water is rarely in short supply, interstate water disputes are uncommon. This includes the southeastern
portion of the United States, with its abundance of lakes, rivers, and
streams. Whereas the West has routinely been the site of interstate
water struggles, the Southeast has traditionally had enough water to
please everyone. However, there have been exceptions. Two such exceptions are the ongoing clash among the states of Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
River system and the dispute between Alabama and Georgia over the
waters of the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River system.
Because these states have repeatedly been unable to reach an
agreement regarding allocation of the waters, and because Congressional apportionment of the waters is a politically non-viable option,
these two "water wars" are likely to find their way to the United States
Supreme Court for an equitable apportionment. Until that time, the
disputes are certain to continue, and the downstream states of Alabama
and Florida will continue to claim harm from the upstream uses of
Georgia, particularly the uses of the ever growing city of Atlanta, with
its seemingly unquenchable thirst.
H. THE RIVER BASINS
A.

The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin

The basins of the Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint ("ACF")
Rivers extend 385 miles and have a total drainage area of approximately 19,800 square miles.2 Roughly 70 percent of Atlanta's water
supply comes from the Chattahoochee.' The Chattahoochee also supplies drinking water to multiple municipalities in both Georgia and
Alabama and provides water for flood control, navigation, and hydropower.4 One of the main uses of the Flint River is irrigation by farmers
in the Southwestern portion of Georgia.' The Apalachicola River flows
into Apalachicola Bay the fresh water needed to support a commercial
2.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, MOBILE DIST., WATER ALLOCATION FOR THE
APALACHICOLA-CHATrAHOOCHEE-FLINT (ACF) RIVER BASIN: ALABAMA, FLORIDA, AND

GEORGIA MAIN REPORT 4-10 (1998) [hereinafter ACF RIVER BASIN], available at
http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/pd/actacfeis/acfMain.pdf
(the drainage of the re-

spective areas are as follows: Apalachicola River 2,680 square miles, Chattahoochee
River 8,770 square miles, Flint River 8,460 square miles). Id. at 4-37.
3. William L. Andreen, State Surveys: Alabama, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 20,
28 (Robert E. Beck ed., Supp. 2004).
4. Id.
5. See Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division, Georgia Flint River Basin Plan, http://www.gadnr.org/frbp/index.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2005).

Issue I

A TALE OF TWO RIVER BASINS

fishing industry, which generates over $100 million per year, making it
the "most productive estuary in Florida."6 Apalachicola Bay, which has
an area of 210 square miles, "yields 90 percent of Florida's (and 10
percent of the country's) commercial oyster harvest .... [It] provides
important nursery habitat for shrimp, red snapper, speckled sea trout,
and blue crabs."7
B.

The Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa Basin

The basins of the Alabama, Coosa, and Tallapoosa ("ACT") Rivers
extend about 320 miles, and the total drainage area of the ACT Basin
to the mouth of the Alabama River is approximately 22,820 square
miles.' The main rivers of the ACT Basin are the Coosa, Tallapoosa,
Cahaba, and Alabama with basin areas of 10,200, 4,680, 1,825, and
22,800 square miles respectively. 9 "The Coosa watershed . . . ranks

third in the United States in terms of freshwater fish diversity."'" Also,
"[t]he Nature Conservancy has classified 18 fish and mussel species
from the Tallapoosa as species at risk and has deemed the conservation
of the Tallapoosa watershed as critical to the conservation of fish and
mussel biodiversity in the United States."" American Rivers, an environmental organization, named the ACF and ACT Basins "among the
of "water
most endangered river systems in the United States" because
2
withdrawals, dams, urban sprawl, and non-point pollution.,'
HI. THE ROAD TO CONFLICT
A.

Atlanta's Population Growth

Over eighty percent of the population of the ACF Basin lives in
Georgia, primarily in the Atlanta area. Since 1950, Atlanta's metropolitan population has increased from less than 500,000 to over four
million.'3 Atlanta's population surge shows no signs of slowing down.
"To put such dramatic population growth in perspective, consider that

6. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF
AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 185-86 (2002).

7.

Id. at 184-85.

8.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, MOBILE DIST., WATER ALLOCATION FOR THE ALABAMA(ACT) RIVER BASIN: ALABAMA AND GEORGIA MAIN REPORT 4-11, 4-12
RIVER
BASIN],
available
at
(1998)
[hereinafter
ACT

COOSA-TALLAPOOSA

http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/pd/actacfeis/actmain.pdf.
9. Id. at 4-40, 4-42 to -43.
10. Andreen, supra note 3, at 29.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 30. (discussing sixteen dams within the ACF system, and seventeen dams
within the ACT system). Id. at 28-29.
13. GLENNON, supranote 6, at 187-88.
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metropolitan Atlanta grows by the total population of the town of Apalachicola every month."'4
Due to the rapid population growth of the Atlanta metropolitan
area during the latter part of the twentieth century,'" the United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") proposed reallocation from hydropower to water supply of two of Georgia's lakes in 1989: Lake Sidney Lanier in the ACF system and Lake Allatoona in the ACT system.'"
According to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division, "[t]he
two river basins make up 38 percent of Georgia's total land area,
provide drinking water to more than 60 percent of the state's
population and supply water for more than 35 percent of Georgia's
irrigated agriculture."' 7
B.

Groundwater Pumping by Georgia Farmers

Partially due to the severe summer droughts in Georgia in the
1980s, "[t]he only farmers who stayed in business were irrigators." 8
The number of acres irrigated by Georgia farmers from the early 1970s
to the early 1990s increased fivefold to over one million." The number
of irrigated acres further increased to about 1.5 million in 2000.' ACF
Basin groundwater withdrawals grew by 240 percent between 1970 and
1990.2' Florida took exception to the increased withdrawals, claiming
the pumping by Georgia farmers from the Florida Aquifer was reducing the Flint River flow reaching Florida.' The Corps prepared an environmental impact statement ("EIS';) in 1998 and found that "the effect of pumping I gallon of groundwater from the Upper Floridan Aquifer would be about a 0.6-gallon reduction in the groundwater contribution to stream flow" in the Flint River. J.B. Ruhl, a law professor at
Florida State University, believes groundwater pumping by South
Georgia farmers is probably as much of a problem as are the withdrawals from Lake Lanier.24

14.

Id. at 188.

15.

Id. at 187-88.

16.

Andreen, supra note 3, at 30-31.

17.

ENVrL. PROT. Div.,

GA. DEP'T. OF NATURAL

REs., GEORGIA'S ENVIRONMENT 10

(2003), available at
http://www.gaepd.org/Files-PDF/gaenviron/annualreport/gaenvO2-03.pdf.
18. GLENNON, supranote 6, at 188.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 189.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 190.
24. Interview with J.B. Ruhl, Assoc. Dean for Academic Affairs and the Matthews &
Hawkins Professor of Prop., Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Apr. 18,

2005).
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C.

Dredging of the Apalachicola River

In order to allow a small number of barges to make deliveries to
small ports in Georgia and Alabama, the Corps has conducted
"extensive dredging" of the Apalchicola River, resulting in large sand
piles along its banks that have eliminated twenty-five miles of
floodplain. 5
This dredging harms the Apalachicola Bay's fishing
industry. Dredging tends to reduce the "amount of nutrients that
floodwaters remove from the floodplain and transport down the river
to the [Apalachicola Bay] estuary." 6 As a result, American Rivers has
placed the Apalachicola River on its 2002 list of America's Most
Endangered Rivers. 7
D. The Comprehensive Study and the Southeastern Water Compacts
In the early 1990s, the Corps conducted studies (collectively
"Comprehensive Study") of the ACT and ACF Basins. 8 According to
the Corps' Mobile (Alabama) District, the purposes of the Comprehensive Study were to:
0 Determine the capabilities of and demands on the water resources
of the basins.
" Develop technical information, strategies, and plans.
" Provide basin-specific tools to evaluate water management alternatives.
" Evaluate alternatives that affect the water resource uses.
* Recommend a formal mechanism to coordinate long-term basinwide management and use of water resources to meet the environmental, public health, and economic needs of the basins.u
The studies required the consensus of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama
on every element of the results.'
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama negotiated, primarily between 1992
and 1997, to form the ACT and ACF Compacts," collectively known as
25.
26.
27.

GLENNON,

supra note 6, at 190.

Id.
Id.

28. U.S. ARMY CoRPs OF ENG'RS, MOBILE DIST., SHARING THE WATER IN ALABAMA,
FLORIDA, AND GEORGIA 2 (1997), available at
http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/pd/actacfeis/files/ 1097.pdf.
29. Id.
30. ACT RIVER BASIN, supra note 8, at 1-5.
31. ACF RIVER BASIN, supra note 2, at 1-5, 1-10; ACT RIVER BASIN, supra note 8, at 14, 1-9 (explaining that the compacts were ratified by the legislatures of each of the
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the Southeastern Water Compacts."' The compacts were the three
states' attempts to come up with a coordination mechanism, the last of
the five purposes of the Comprehensive Study. The compacts contained no allocation formula, which is noteworthy "since most water
compacts allocate water."" They "essentially froze present uses on both
river systems in place while the three states and the Corps ... stud [ied]
how to resolve the controversy ....

The two compacts [were] merely

agreements to agree[.]"" Georgia, Florida, and Alabama "concluded
that they would prefer to take their chances in court-ultimately, in equitable apportionment litigation-rather than control their own destinies through compromise. Only the future will demonstrate their wisdom or the lack thereof. " 5
The compacts included language "specifically protecting water
quality and endangered species, as provided under federal law. " ' Any
allocation resulting from the implementation of the compacts by the
United States must be "to the maximum extent practicable, in a manner consistent with the formula so long as it does not conflict with federal law." 7 Furthermore, none of the states should have their rights to
control the waters within their respective borders disturbed by the
compacts, as long as "the state does not act inconsistently with the allocation formula. " '
Each compact created a commission composed of the governor of
each of the states and a representative from the federal government.
Each state governor received one vote (decisions were to be unanimous), and the federal representative received no vote 9 but could only
object to any proposed formula if such formula violated federal law.

three states, signed by their respective governors, approved by Congress, and signed by

President Clinton, thus making them federal law for the duration of the compacts).
32. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 9.06(c) (3), 9-210 (Robert E. Beck ed., Supp.
2001).
33.

Interview with Nolton Johnson, Ga. Envtl. Prot. Dep't, Water Res. Div. (Apr. 19,

2005).
34. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supranote 32, at 9-210 to -211.
35. Charles T. DuMars & David Seeley, The Failureof the Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeHint River Basin and Alabama-Coosa-TallapoosaRiver Basin Compacts and a Guide to the
Successful Establishment of Interstate Water Compacts, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 384 (2004).
36. ANDREEN, supra note 10, at 32.
37. Id. at 34.

38.

Id.

39. Josh Clemons, Water-Sharing Compact Dissolves, 23 WATER LOG 1, 11 (2003),
available
at
http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/MS-

AL/Water%20Log%20PDF/23.3.pdf (stating that the voting mechanism was "a structural flaw that effectively ensured its demise.").
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1.

The Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Compact 0

The ACT Compact, between Alabama and Georgia, controls allocation of the surface waters of the ACT Basin,' which is comprised of
"the Alabama River, the Coosa River, the Tallapoosa River, all their
associated tributaries, as well as the Cahaba River.""
An agreement on the ACT Compact was not expressly contingent
upon an agreement on the ACF Compact. At one point, however,
Georgia, unlike Alabama, linked the ACT Compact with the ACF
Compact. As a prerequisite to an agreement with Alabama on the
ACT, Georgia wanted assurance that the ACF would meet its needs.
Georgia believed Alabama should help on the ACF and did not believe
Alabama had any "substantial disagreement" on the ACF. In return,
Georgia felt it could help Alabama on the ACT.4
In the months leading up to the ACT's July 2004 expiration date,
Trey Glenn, former director of Alabama's Office of Water Resources,
remained "optimistic" that a resolution would be reached with Georgia
regarding the ACT Basin." Likewise, Charles T. DuMars, an attorney
representing Georgia, felt something was "possible on the ACT ...
there's communication." ' Despite their high hopes, the ACT Compact
expired on July 31, 2004.
Because there was no express linkage between the ACT and ACF
Compacts, the ACT Compact's failure was not directly due to the ACF
Compact's failure. Professor William Andreen of the University of
Alabama School of Law believes the ACT Compact failed because Alabama was not happy with the amount of water Georgia wanted to withdraw from Lake Allatoona for use in Cobb County. The later discharge
of that water includes waste water in the Chattahoochee system. '

40.

Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105, 111 Stat.

2233 (1997).
41. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.03, at 46-9 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2004) (stat-

ing ACF and ACT "make some references to groundwater, but the provision in each
compact calling for the development of a formula to allocate water among the signatory states refers only to surface water."). Id. at 46-9 to -10.
42. ALA. DEP'T. OF ECON. & CMTY. AFFAIRS OFFICE OF WATER RES., ALABAmA - COOSA TALLAPOOSA (ACT) RIVER BASIN COMPACT 1, http://www.actcompact.alabama.gov/ (last
visited Dec. 15, 2005).
43. Telephone Interview with Bruce Brown, McKinna Long & Aldridge, L.L.P. in
Atlanta, Ga. (Apr. 27, 2005).
44. Telephone Interview with Onis "Trey" Glenn III, Dir. of the Ala. Dep't. of Envtl.
Mgmt. (Oct. 17, 2005).

45.

Telephone Interview with Charles T. DuMars, Professor of Law, Univ. of N. M.

Sch. of Law (Oct. 14, 2005).

46. E-mail from William Andreen, Edgar L. Clarkson Professor of Law, Univ. of Ala.
Sch. of Law (May 2, 2005) (on file with author).
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The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Compact47

The ACF Compact controls surface water allocation of the ACF Basin.' The compact gave the ACF Basin Commission the authority "to
develop an allocation formula for equitably apportioning the surface
waters" of the basin among Georgia, Alabama and Florida. 9 However,
"[t]he apportionment only of surface water is curious indeed, for it
exempts pumping by Flint River farmers from control by the commission."' The Compact also contains a one-state-one vote mechanism
requiring unanimity, which practically allows "Georgia cities and farms
to divert and pump with impunity. "
The ACF Compact was to terminate if the ACF Basin Commission
did not reach an agreement by December 31, 1998.
Negotiations
deadlocked and, following a series of deadline extensions,53 the ACF
compact officially expired on August 31, 2003." In December 2003,
Georgia and Alabama agreed on management of the ACT system, but
this agreement was contingent on Georgia reaching an agreement with
Florida regarding the ACF system; since there was no ACF agreement
before the final deadline, the ACT agreement between Georgia and
Alabama was void. However, because the available waters cannot meet
the water needs of the three states, an allocation agreement is still necessary. The dispute did not end with the termination of the Southeastern Water Compact, though there are "some noise about getting the
three states back together."5 Professor Andreen claims, "[i] t will take a
long time." 6 Donna Christie, a law professor at Florida State University
College of Law, agrees, "[i] t looks like we're in for a long fight." 7
47. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104,
111 Stat. 2219 (1997).
48. ALA. DEP'T. OF ECON. & CMTY. AFFAIRS OFFICE OF WATER REs., APALACHICOLA CHATTAHOOCHEE - FLINT (ACF) RIVER BASIN COMPACT 1, www.acfcompact.alabama.gov/
(last visited Dec. 15, 2005).

49. 111 Stat. at 2222-23. According to Art. XIII of the Compact, "only equitable
relief, and not money damages, shall be available in a proceeding to enforce the compact water allocation formula." 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.05(d), 46-29 n.175
(Robert E. Beck ed., 2004).
50. GLENNON, supra note 6, at 191.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53, Id.
54. ALA. DEPT. OF ECON. & CMTY.AFFAIRs OFFICE OF WATER REs., APAIACHICOLA CHATTAHOOCHEE - FLINT (ACF) RIVER BASIN COMPACT 1, www.acfcompact.alabama.gov/
(last visited Dec. 15, 2005).
55. Interview with William S. Cox III, Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., N. Birmingham, Ala. (May 5, 2005).
56. Interview with William Andreen, Edgar L. Clarkson Professor of Law, Univ. of
Ala. Sch. of Law, in Tuscaloosa, Ala. (May 2, 2005).
57. E-mail from Donna Christie, Elizabeth C. and Clyde W. Atkinson Professor and
Assoc. Dean for Int'l Programs, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Apr. 19, 2005) (on file
with author).
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IV. CURRENT LTIGATION
There are currently three active suits in the "water wars" litigation.
William "Buddy" Cox, a lawyer at Lightfoot, Franklin and White in
North Birmingham, Alabama, classifies the situation as "a federal civil
procedure exam nightmare." 8 A summary of the three suits follows.
A.

State of Alabama v. United States Army Corps of Engineers 9

Alabama, concerned that the reallocation proposed by the Corps in
1989 would "raise hydropower costs, harm water quality, and prevent
further economic development,"' filed suit against the Corps on June
28, 1990, in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama ("N.D. Ala. Court")." According to Cox, the biggest problem for Alabama is "resource management, particularly during low
flow conditions."6 2 Alabama has been steadfast throughout the dispute,
wanting to protect the state's uses of water for supply, irrigation, navigation," hydropower, and recreation.'
The suit, which is currently on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, alleged the Corps' 1989 reallocation of Lake Lanier violated Alabama's water rights.' In September 1990, Florida intervened
to protect Apalachicola Bay's oyster and fishing industry, and Georgia
intervened to protect its sovereign power over water within its borders.' Alabama and Florida were concerned about both the quantity
and the quality of the water reaching them from the upstream Atlanta
metropolitan area. "The inadequacy of sewage treatment presents
quality problems, especially in the City of Atlanta where a unitary sewage system spills raw sewage with heavy storm runoff." 7
B.

SoutheasternFederalPower Customers, Inc. v. Caldera"

In December 2000, Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc.
("SFPC")' brought suit against the Corps in the United States District

58. Interview with William S. Cox III, supranote 55.
59. 382 F.Supp. 2d 1301 (N.D. Ala. 2005), vacated and remanded, 424 F.3d 1117
(11th Cir. 2005).
60.
Clemons, supra note 39, at 1.
61.
Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 382 F.Supp. 2d at 1304.
62.
Interview with William S. Cox III, supra note 55.
63. JOSEPH L. SAX, ETAL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 71 (3d ed. 2000).
64. Telephone Interview with Onis "Trey" Glenn III, supranote 44.
65. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,382 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.

66.

Id.

67. James L. Bross, Georgia, in6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 301, 310 (Robert E. Beck
ed., 1994).
68. 301 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004).
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Court for the District of Columbia ("D.D.C. Court"), challenging the
Corps' allocation of additional water from Lake Lanier for municipal
uses.' Georgia moved to intervene, and SFPC and the Corps agreed to
allow Georgia to participate in mediation beginning in March 2001.'
In January 2003, the parties reached an agreement ("D.C. Agreement"
The agreement gave Georgia municior "Settlement Agreement").
palities the right to contract with the Corps for additional water out of
Lake Lanier for municipal and industrial water supplies.73 The agreement was to last for ten years, with the option to extend to twenty years,
and would give the Atlanta area enough water to meet its current and
some future needs. Furthermore,
[Tihe Settlement Agreement makes no disposition of the water in
Lake Lanier itself. Rather, the Settlement Agreement deals solely
with the subject of water storage. While Alabama and Florida may be
apprehensive that Georgia will allow the Water Supply Providers to
take their fill up to their storage quota, the actual extraction of water
stored in Lake Lanier for water supply purposes is entirely governed
by the permitting process administered by the State of Georgia. The
Corps itself has no authority to control water withdrawals. Under the
WSA, it can only reserve the storage from which those withdrawals
may be made. Even if the Settlement Agreement were to authorize all
of Lake Lanier as water storage for municipal and industrial water
supply, the actual withdrawal of that water would be up to the state
permitting authorities. 74
Florida and Alabama moved to intervene in the D.C. litigation and
also sought relief in the Northern District of Alabama.' In an October
15, 2003 order, the N.D. Ala. Court stated the singular question before
it was whether the D.C. Agreement violated the Northern District's
September 19, 1990 stay order.' The stay order was "governed in part
by a precedent Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings," the relevant language of which "forbid the Corps from execut[ing] any contracts or
agreements which [were] the subject of the complaint in [the]77 action
unless expressly agreed to, in writing, by Alabama and Florida."
69. SFPC "is a non-profit corporate consortium of rural electric cooperatives and
municipal electric systems supplying electric power to their customers in the southeastern United States." Id. at 30.
70. Id.
71. Id. (explaining that by the time Georgia reached a settlement with the Corps,
the granting of its motion to intervene had yet to occur).
72. Id.
73.
74.

Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 32.

75.

Id. at 30.

76.

Alabama v. Florida, No. CV 90-BE-1331-E (N.D. Ala. Oct. 15, 2003) (order

granting preliminary injunction).
77. Id.
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Georgia and the Corps argued that a 1992 Northern District order
superceded the 1990 stay order.'8 The N.D. Ala. Court disagreed, holding the 1990 stay order and the precedentJoint Motion were the governing documents at the time when Georgia and the Corps entered
into the D.C. Agreement.' The court stated, "[n]o clear path lies before the Corps that it can take to satisfy all of the parties .... Water is a
limited resource, and Alabama, Georgia and Florida all have seemingly
unlimited [sic] uses for it. " '°
The district court found the D.C. Agreement in violation of the
1990 stay order, holding the D.C. Agreement implicated "the subject of
the complaint: the duty of the Corps to allocate water from the Buford
Dam/Lake Lanier Project in a lawful manner."" The court conceded
the possible physical injury the D.C. Agreement posed to Alabama and
Florida "may be gradual" but held "[t]he injury to the status quo
placed on the Corps' decisionmaking ability in this area, however, will
be instant. '"" Though the court acknowledged the D.C. Agreement
appeared purely intrastate (i.e. appeared to be an agreement between
only Georgia parties), it stated "its effects will resonate in every state
that shares the ACF river basin.""3
The district court granted Alabama's and Florida's motion for preliminary injunction against enforcement of the D.C. Agreement.' The
injunction enjoined Georgia and the Corps from filing the D.C.
Agreement, implementing any part of the D.C. Agreement, and "entering into any other new storage or withdrawal contracts affecting the
ACF Basin without approval of N.D. Ala." "5 The Corps and Georgia
appealed, and Gwinnett County, Georgia intervened.
After Georgia and the Corps appealed, the D.D.C. Court rejected
Alabama's and Florida's attacks on the Settlement Agreement, approving the settlement on February 10, 2004.' However, the court held
"the Settlement Agreement may not be executed or implemented until
the injunction entered by N.D. Ala. has been dissolved.""7
[T]his Court concludes that the Settlement Agreement is fair and
reasonable, and neither illegal nor contrary to public policy. Execution of the Settlement Agreement, and any implementation thereof, is
however, subject to Judge Bowdre's injunction, and to that end, be78.
79.

Id.
Id.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

84.

S. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F.Supp.2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2004).

85.

Id.

86. Id. at 35; Interview with William S. Cox III, supra note 55 (stating that in Caldera,
Georgia "got what it wanted").
87. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31.
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fore they may act under the Settlement Agreement, the parties to it
must first obtain dissolution of the injunction in N.D. Ala.88
On April 8, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit stayed the appeal of the
Northern District of Alabama's October 15, 2003 preliminary injunction, remanding for the limited purpose of allowing the N.D. Ala.
Court to consider dissolving its injunction on the basis of the D.D.C.
Court's order.' On February 18, 2005, the N.D. Ala. Court issued an
order refusing to dissolve the injunction, and held there has been no
change in circumstances "that would justify lifting the injunction. " '
The N.D. Ala. Court held the D.D.C. Court's February 10, 2004 order
approving the D.C. Agreement did "not affect the findings upon which
this court based its preliminary injunction."" Finally, the N.D. Ala.
Court held the injunction was to stay in place "until the case is resolved
on the merits, and may be lifted earlier 'for just cause.'"9"
C.

Georgiav. U.S. Army Corps of Engineer

In May 2000, Georgia petitioned the Corps for more water from
Lake Lanier. The Corps resisted because it believed it did not have
authorization divert water from hydroelectric uses. Georgia responded
by suing the Corps in the Northern District of Georgia ("N.D. Georgia
Court") over the denial of its Water Supply Request. ' The N.D. Georgia Court has since issued an order abating and administratively closing this case, pending final judgment in the N.D. Ala. Court litigation."
According to Bruce Brown,' an attorney for Georgia, the critical issue in the Northern District of Georgia litigation was "may, must, or
must not the Corps operate Lake Lanier in accordance with the directive of the State of Georgia to operate the lake for the purpose of water
supply."97 Brown believes Georgia's position is that the Corps must follow its lead as the home state, unless such lead is contrary to clear congressional intent.' Brown points to Calfornia v. United Stater in support of his position:
88. Id. at 35.
89. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 357 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1316 (N.D. Ala.
2005).
90. Id. at 1317.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1318.
93. 223 F.R.D. 691 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
94. Id. at 693. The last paragraph of the section entitled "Georgia's Position" discusses this issue.
95. Id. at 699.
96. Mr. Brown's views do not necessarily reflect the position of Georgia.
97. E-mail from Bruce Brown, McKinna Long & Aldridge, L.L.P. in Atlanta, Ga.
(Apr. 27, 2005) (on file with author).
98. Id.
99. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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Since it is clear that the States have the control of water within their
boundaries, it is essential that each and every owner along a given water course, including the United States, must be amenable to the law
of the State, if there is to be a proper administration of the water law
as it has developed over the years.'l°
Brown says, "[s] ince Congress intended Lake Lanier to be used for
water supply for the growing North Georgia region, then the Corps
must follow the state's directive."'01
An issue arising from this suit is to what extent the Corps should
consider Georgia's obligations to downstream Florida and Alabama.
Brown believes forcing the Corps to allocate all or part of the waters of
Lake Lanier for municipal use "does not have anything to do with
Georgia's obligation . . . to deliver to Florida and Alabama their fair
share of water at the state line."' '° Brown continues,
If, on the other hand, you allow the Corps to take into account the interests of downstream states in determining how to operate a particular reservoir, as Alabama and Florida contend, then the Corps will be
making the decisions that the U.S. Supreme Court is supposed to
make, and the state (Georgia) will be deprived of its ability to make
necessary intrastate water allocation decisions.'0 3
Georgia's position is that the Corps does not have the statutory or
constitutional authority to allocate water among the states and therefore cannot take into account the interests of downstream states.
However, if a downstream state obtains, from either the Supreme
Court or interstate compact, an allocation from the ACF, then Georgia
must provide the amount of water allocated to such user(s), regardless
of the amount of water pumped out of Lake Lanier for intrastate water
supply. In such case, the Corps would have to operate its reservoirs in
accordance with the allocation.
V. GEORGIA VERSUS FLORIDA. THE MAIN EVENT
A.

Georgia's Position

Because of the tremendous need for water brought about by the
vast increase in the population of the Atlanta metropolitan area, Georgia asserts that it has a right to divert a large amount of water and that
its uses of the water are reasonable. "Intrastate water allocation decisions are made by the state itself," says Brown.' ° To defend its position
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 678-79 (citing S. REP. No. 755, at 6 (1951)).
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that there should be no limits on its ability to pump groundwater
within its borders, Georgia asserts state sovereignty."5 "Georgia advocates keeping the reservoirs, most of which are located in Georgia,
filled as though a drought were imminent; the continuing diversions
necessary to accomplish this would effectively lower river flows and
would provide Georgia with water for future growth."'"
With regard to the ACF system, DuMars, another attorney representing Georgia, avers Alabama's use is miniscule and that rates of flow
out of Lake Lanier do not significantly affect Alabama.' 7 Professor
Ruhl, who feels the genuine fight is between Florida and Georgia, the
"two principal disputants," reinforces this belief.'" The fundamental
difference between the ACT and ACF systems is that Florida asserts
that it should be able to compel a release of ACF water for environmental purposes."n However, there has never been such a case, and
DuMars finds it "hard to understand why the Supreme Court would get
ahead of Congress in this regard." 0. He does not think the Supreme
Court will equitably apportion a greater amount than Congress requires, since in no case has the Supreme Court undertaken to preempt
or contradict a congressional determination."'
To combat Florida's claims for more water, DuMars feels it is important to differentiate between the water stored in Lake Lanier and
the entire ACF system: "Compacts do not allocate water from reservoirs; they allocate water from river systems.""' He claims the vast majority of the water in the ACF system enters the system below Atlanta
and, thus, below Lake Lanier."' Therefore, Atlanta's consumptive use
of Lanier's water "is extraordinarily small compared to the entire ACF
basin."" DuMars notes "much more than half" of Atlanta's diversions
return to the Chattahoochee." ' DuMars continues,
Florida attempts to focus on Atlanta and ignore all of the other water
that flows across their border. Below Atlanta there is no physical way
to stop [Florida] from getting the water except by consumption, since
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there are no
deep reservoir sites... there are no reservoirs at all on
6
the Flint."
According to DuMars, roughly 95 percent of the waters from the
Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers in Georgia currently reach Florida and
Alabama."7 DuMars feels the fact that these states receive almost all of
the usable water from the ACF system makes their case for more water
more difficult."8
Legally, downstream states must show present injury."9 Brown believes Supreme Court adjudication is "way away" because neither Alabama nor Florida is able to show injury from Georgia's "reasonable
use."" Brown notes only Georgia and the Atlanta Regional Commission ("ARC") have offered evidence regarding the impact of Georgia's
use of its waters upon Florida. 2 ' Two separate affidavits from qualified
experts, based upon results using the computer model used by all
three states in the interstate compact negotiations, established that the
marginal impact of the D.C. Agreement upon Florida was barely even
detectable. Significantly, neither Florida nor Alabama, who have access
to the same computer model, has submitted affidavits rebutting the
evidence submitted by Georgia and ARC. Brown says,
Florida has not attempted to make the kind of factual showing necessary for a Supreme Court equitable apportionment case. Florida has
asserted that it has substantial ecological interests inthe Apalachicola
River and Bay, but has not explained or documented how Georgia's
reasonable
use of the water has affected or is likely to affect those in122
terests.
Even if Florida established direct impact, it must still show Georgia's uses are unreasonable relative to other uses. Given the large and
growing population of Atlanta, and given that residential use is generally the highest priority use of water, proving Georgia's residential uses
are unreasonable will prove to be a near impossible task.
Brown notes another problem with Florida's position is that Florida
diverts the water, using it for paper mills, for example.'2" Thus, Florida's concerns over the potential damage to the Apalachicola Bay are
weak, given that it routinely diverts water for various other uses. From
Georgia's perspective, if its diversions are harming Apalachicola Bay, so
are Florida's. Professor Ruhl acknowledges Florida diverts water, but
116.
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says Florida's diversions are "miniscule" compared to Georgia's." Almost all the land along the Apalachicola River is publicly owned,
"meaning [Florida] will never divert more water than [Georgia]
do[es]."'5 Furthermore, since paper mills, which Georgia cites as part

of the reasons
for past diversions, are closing, Florida "will be reducing
'
diversions. ""

Florida maintains the Apalachicola basin is a precarious and rich
area of biodiversity and a habitat to numerous creatures. Brown, however, says Florida has not documented the impact of Georgia's use of
the ACF waters on these environmental interests and has not compared such impact to impacts caused by Florida's own industry and
development along the river." In addition, according to Brown, Florida has all the protection it needs from the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"), "compliance with which would 'trump' any other subservient
use of the water. '"" Since the ESA trumps other law, Florida's protection is sufficient. Brown analogizes it to a bundle of property rights.'"
With respect to interstate water, there are a number of sticks in the
bundle, including water quality, which federal law governs under the
Clean Water Act and the ESA. So no matter what, Georgia is obligated
to provide: clean water to downstream users, navigational opportunities (also a federal servitude), intrastate allocation of the water itself, as
well as providing for interstate rights. This protects Florida, as do numerous other federal laws. Thus, according to Brown, the state has all
the protection it needs.'"
Professor Ruhl says Florida will raise federal law claims if it needs
to."' In fact, the state issued a 60-day notice of intent to sue the Corps
for ESA violations, but has yet to file suit. Ruhl suspects Florida's strategy "is to put the ESA in play before seeking Supreme Court adjudication of water rights."' Ruhl adds, "[w] ith the three other federal suits
in stalemate, it also seems in Florida's interests to sit on the status quo
13 3
and wait for Georgia to get aggressive and look greedy."

Georgia avers its uses of the water are presumptively reasonable
and believes the courts will agree. Georgia also claims it is not wasting
the water. Atlanta has strict waste use restrictions and insists it is a
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good steward of the water. This, the state hopes, will ensure that Florida will not have legal recourse. In support of the view that Georgia
has not made unreasonable use of the water, Brown says,
If Alabama or Florida had been or were threatened with the kind and
degree of injury that is necessary to trigger a Supreme Court equitable apportionment case, then one of them would have filed suit already rather than laboring for years now in the district courts in cases
that will not establish their entitlement to a certain amount of water
vis-A-vis Georgia.134

One problem concerns the physical regulation of these basins by
dams. The Corps controls the reservoirs which in turn govern the flow
of the rivers. The Corps, therefore, can determine how recipients use
the water. If the Corps uses Lake Lanier's water for hydropower, Florida benefits because a much larger amount of water will bypass Atlanta
and head downstream. An issue that arises is what role the Corps is to
play in the interstate allocation of water when there is no governing
compact. How is the Corps supposed to conduct itself in order to respect the relative rights of all the users? Brown's answer is that the
Corps must listen to the home state.'3 5 Therefore, Georgia owns the
water while it is within its borders. Georgia's position is that the Corps
must cede to its interests, given that there is not yet a congressional
mandate to trump its instructions as the home state."
Therefore,
7
Brown believes the Corps must follow Georgia's lead.'
B.

Florida's Position

Florida's argument is that "releases from the reservoirs should
mimic historic (predam) flows."'" Florida wants to protect the flow of
natural fresh water into Apalachicola Bay in order to maintain the
proper salinity levels needed to support the Bay's fishing industry.
Both Georgia's and Florida's modifications of the hydrologic models
support their own positions with regard to the proper allocation of
surface waters. In this sense, according to the Nature Conservancy,
Georgia and Florida "have slipped into a battle of the [hydrologic]
models.""
Both the ACF and the ACT Compacts provided that their principle
objective in equitably apportioning surface waters was "to be carried
134. E-mail from Bruce Brown, supranote 97.
135. Id.
136. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 223 F.R.D. 691, 695 (N.D. Ga. 2004); Email from Bruce Brown, supra note 97.
137. E-mail from Bruce Brown, supranote 97.
138. GLENNON, supra note 6, at 192.
139. Id.
140. Id.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

out 'while protecting the water quality, ecology and biodiversity' of the
stream system in question..' .4 "Florida's interest is in maintaining eco-

logical quality downstream of water-hungry Georgia and into Apalachicola Bay."'42 Professor Christie says, "[w]ater allocation litigation
among states doesn't have much of a history of protecting or even considering instream and ecosystem uses, so Florida will have an uphill
battle in convincing the Supreme Court to recognize this (or not).""'
The Supreme Court has held "a State seeking to prevent or enjoin
a diversion by another State bears the burden of proving that the diversion will cause it 'real or substantial injury or damage."""4 Traditionally, the Supreme Court looks mainly to economic injury to determine
the extent of the damage. "[U]nder the Supreme Court's conventional approaches to interstate water allocation, Florida loses.'

4

5

To

compensate, Florida must urge the Supreme Court to take into account the injury to the Apalachicola's ecological system." Given the
broad range of issues and considerations the Supreme Court takes into
account in equitable apportionment litigation, there is no genuine
basis for the Supreme Court to refuse to consider environmental
harm.'47 The question will be what weight the Supreme Court will give
these concerns relative to other concerns. 8
"Ecological injury in fact is economic injury, because healthy functioning ecosystems provide immensely valuable services to human
populations."' 9 Ecosystem services "are only services because they provide something of value to humans."" Professor Ruhl stated, "[i] f one
could show a loss attributable to diminished ecosystem services, then
one also ought to be able to express the loss in economic terms for
purposes of standing, so the issue of non-economic injury is avoided."'5 '
As a possible indication of the value of Florida's ecosystem, Florida

141.
5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 52. 0 6(c)(1), 188 n.317 (Robert E. Beck ed.,
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State University graduate student Greg Garrett estimated the value of
the Apalachicola ecosystem to exceed $5 billion per year.'52
Ruhl proffers the idea that the Supreme Court should account for
ecological injury, as it is the "logical, incremental extension(s)" of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Idaho v. Oregon, in which the Court apportioned salmon runs between two states. ' Ruhl equates the salmon
runs with the ecosystem services of the Apalachicola because both "are
economically valuable resources that flow within" their respective water
systems."4
There is also a question of whether Florida can show actual, present injury as a downstream state. This is why Ruhl emphasizes ecosystem service losses as a possible alternate category of injury. Regardless,
Ruhl does not believe the Supreme Court would toss out the case for
failure to show sufficient standing, partly because "there has not been
an apportionment case like this since the dawn of the environmental
age."' All Florida wants is "flow, no more diversions."' 6 Proving harm
to Florida, Ruhl acknowledges, "is indeed a hard question," but he argues "the Court has to revisit what counts as harm."' 7 Because environmental harm, for example to oyster beds might be irreparable,
Ruhl believes the Supreme Court ought to look differently at the harm
requirement when the environment is involved."M However, if the
Court does decide to take environmental harm into account when assessing present injury, the result could lead to suits by virtually all
downstream users against upstream diverters. In order to avoid this
slippery slope, the Court may choose to continue to disregard environmental damage in its analysis of present injury.
VI. AVAILABLE LEGAL REMEDIES
The termination of the ACF and ACT Compacts do not spell the
end of the story. "The waters available are not sufficient to meet full
demand in the three states so one means or another will have to be
found to resolve their dispute.""
Under the current regime, there are three avenues for allocating
interstate waters among the states where the waters are located. First,
the states can negotiate a solution. The states have tried this to no
avail. Secondly, Congress can craft a remedy, such as an apportionment via statutory determination, under its interstate commerce
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power.'" For political reasons, this option is highly unlikely. Finally,
the Supreme Court can exercise its original jurisdiction over interstate
suits and formulate an equitable allocation of the waters.'61 In Nebraska
v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court held "mutual accommodation and
agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of
invocation of our adjudicatory power." ' However, as in Nebraska, the
states in the conflict are not able to settle their disputes through interstate compacts. Thus, "[t]he states' likely next step is litigation before
the U.S. Supreme Court for an equitable allocation of the disputed
waters." 63
The Supreme Court has the authority to equitably apportion inter-

state waters. In Hinderliderv. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., the
Supreme Court held "whether the water of an interstate stream must
be apportioned between . . .States is a question of 'federal common
"The decision implies that no State can undermine the
law.""'
federal interest in equitably apportioned interstate waters.""
Equitable allocation does not mean "there must be an equal division of the waters of an interstate stream among the States through
which it flows."'" As the Supreme Court has stated,
It means that the principles of right and equity shall be applied having regard to the "equal level or plane on which all the States stand,
in point of power and right, under our constitutional system" and
that, upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending
States and all other relevant facts, this Court will determine what is an
equitable apportionment of the use of such waters.
The Supreme Court has traditionally considered a multitude of factors when ruling on an equitable apportionment, such as reasonableness of use, gravity of harm or injury, and conservation measures. In
Nebraska, the Court held,
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a
consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding
principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use
of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of
return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
160.
161.
162.
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water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream
areas if a limitation is imposed on the former - these are all relevant
factors. l6
No single factor is controlling. Rather, the Court usually considers
the totality of the circumstances. "Our aim is always to secure a just
" 1'
and equitable apportionment 'without quibbling over formulas. 'w
The Court in Colorado continued,
The laws of the contending States concerning intrastate water disputes are an important consideration governing equitable apportionment.... But state law is not controlling. Rather, the just apportionment of interstate waters is a question of federal law that depends
"upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending States
''
and all other relevantfacts. 17
Therefore, though the Court would consider all riparian rights of
the individual states, the Court would not be bound by the laws of any
of the states. The Court would look to the totality of the circumstances
to arrive at the most equitable division of the waters. If the Supreme
Court equitably apportions the waters among the three states, this
"probably means that no state will get all that it wants, but each state
will get at least some of what it wants.''.
According to DuMars, if the Supreme Court took the case, it would
appoint a Special Master to determine how much water is actually
reaching Florida and Florida would have the burden of proof.n Florida must show injury just to have standing. 13 The current studies of the
Apalachicola Bay show no such damage. 14 Florida claims there will be
future damage, but since it cannot prove this, DuMars believes the
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Special Master should throw out the case.'7" There will not be equitable apportionment for events that have not occurred because the Supreme Court does not speculate. Actual, present injury is necessary. If
Florida could show enough injury to gain standing, the Supreme Court
would perform a balancing test. DuMars feels the big issue is, if the
matter comes before the Supreme Court, whether the Court will craft a
federal common law concerning interstate water quality." There is
currently no such law, so this could turn out to be the most salient and
most important issue of the dispute.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is no clear answer for any of the questions or dilemmas
posed by the Alabama-Georgia or the Alabama-Florida-Georgia water
allocation disputes. What is clear is that a resolution is not in the near
future due to the complexity of the issues and litigation. In the meantime, Atlanta will continue to grow and require larger amounts of water from Lake Lanier to meet its municipal needs. Until the unreasonableness of such uses are shown, Atlanta will face no repercussions for
its substantial withdrawals. Furthermore, without a court order, South
Georgia farmers will continue to pump groundwater freely.
Alabama's best bet appears to be to cooperate with Georgia. Because Alabama does not appear to be able to show serious, present injury in the ACF dispute, its willingness to work with Georgia on ACF
matters should only help it get what it wants with regard to the ACT.
If Florida's economic injury increases to the point where the courts
would traditionally intervene, Florida should get the equitable relief it
seeks. However, without showing present economic injury, Florida will
continue to fight an uphill battle. Therefore, Florida should push forward with its ecosystem services injury argument. If Georgia moves for
dismissal of all claims against Florida for failure to show present injury,
Florida's alternative ecosystem services theory could give Florida a way
to continue in the absence of the traditional requirement of serious
economic injury. This would afford the Supreme Court the chance to
rule definitively on the issue of environmental injury.
If Florida is able to show Georgia's diversions or uses are damaging
the quality of downstream flows, it might be able to seek an equitable
remedy. However, there is no interstate or federal common law right
to water quality.'77 The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Water
Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 preempt the federal common
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law of nuisance.'78 However, if downstream users can show poor or inadequate quality of the flows they receive, then federal lawsuits under
the CWA or ESA are cognizable. This might be Florida's best option,
considering its inability to show present economic injury resulting
from Georgia's uses of the ACF waters and considering the uncertainty
of the viability of Professor Ruhl's ecosystem services argument.
Florida should also press its claims of damage from groundwater
pumping by south Georgia farmers. Because the compacts exempted
groundwater pumping, Georgia farmers have, to this poin.t, pumped
freely. Because the farmer's pumping has a direct effect on the surface
waters of the Flint River, and thus an effect on the amount of water
that eventually reaches the Apalachicola River and Bay, Florida would
be wise to seek to curtail the amount of pumping available to Georgia
farmers. To do this, Florida must prove the adverse effects of such
pumping on downstream flows. If Florida demonstrates the relationship between groundwater pumping and the amount of flows it receives, there is a good chance the Supreme Court will limit the Georgia
farmers' ability to pump."'
One of the most interesting aspects of these two interstate water
struggles is the possibility that, in resolving the dispute, the courts "may
create new law."" The issues and claims involved will give the federal
judiciary the opportunity to address, among other things, the idea of
an interstate common law right to water quality and the novel position
to consider environmental damage when assessing present injury of
downstream users. However, until the courts rule on issues of water
quality or environmental injury, or until a ruling regarding the reasonableness of Atlanta's uses of Lake Lanier's water occurs, the only likely
recourse for downstream users is to attempt to prevail on federal law
claims. Save a federal law remedy or Supreme Court intervention, the
downstream states of Florida and Alabama are up the creek.
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